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Abstract
We determine the exact sum secure degrees of freedom (d.o.f.) of the K-user Gaus-
sian interference channel. We consider three different secrecy constraints: 1) K-user
interference channel with one external eavesdropper (IC-EE), 2) K-user interference
channel with confidential messages (IC-CM), and 3) K-user interference channel with
confidential messages and one external eavesdropper (IC-CM-EE). We show that for
all of these three cases, the exact sum secure d.o.f. is K(K−1)2K−1 . We show converses for
IC-EE and IC-CM, which imply a converse for IC-CM-EE. We show achievability for
IC-CM-EE, which implies achievability for IC-EE and IC-CM. We develop the con-
verses by relating the channel inputs of interfering users to the reliable rates of the
interfered users, and by quantifying the secrecy penalty in terms of the eavesdrop-
pers’ observations. Our achievability uses structured signaling, structured cooperative
jamming, channel prefixing, and asymptotic real interference alignment. While the
traditional interference alignment provides some amount of secrecy by mixing unin-
tended signals in a smaller sub-space at every receiver, in order to attain the optimum
sum secure d.o.f., we incorporate structured cooperative jamming into the achievable
scheme, and intricately design the structure of all of the transmitted signals jointly.
∗This work was supported by NSF Grants CNS 09-64632, CCF 09-64645, CCF 10-18185 and CNS 11-
47811.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study secure communications in multi-user interference networks from
an information-theoretic point of view. The security of communication was first studied by
Shannon via a noiseless wiretap channel [1]. Noisy wiretap channel was introduced by Wyner
who determined its capacity-equivocation region for the degraded case [2]. His result was gen-
eralized to arbitrary, not necessarily degraded, wiretap channels by Csiszar and Korner [3],
and extended to Gaussian wiretap channels by Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman [4]. This
line of research has been subsequently extended to many multi-user settings, e.g., broad-
cast channels with confidential messages [5, 6], multi-receiver wiretap channels [7–10] (see
also a survey on extensions of these to MIMO channels [11]), interference channels with
confidential messages [5,12], interference channels with external eavesdroppers [13], multiple
access wiretap channels [14–18], wiretap channels with helpers [19], relay eavesdropper chan-
nels [20–25], compound wiretap channels [26,27], etc. While the channel models involving a
single transmitter, such as broadcast channels with confidential messages and multi-receiver
wiretap channels, are relatively better understood, the channel models involving multiple
independent transmitters, such as interference channels with confidential messages and/or
external eavesdroppers, multiple access wiretap channels, wiretap channels with helpers, and
relay-eavesdropper channels, are much less understood. The exact secrecy capacity regions
of all these multiple-transmitter models remain unknown, even in the case of simple Gaus-
sian channels. In the absence of exact secrecy capacity regions, achievable secure degrees
of freedom (d.o.f.) at high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regimes has been studied in the lit-
erature [28–40]. In this paper, we focus on the K-user interference channel with secrecy
constraints, and determine its exact sum secure d.o.f.
The K-user Gaussian interference channel with secrecy constraints consists of K
transmitter-receiver pairs each wishing to have secure communication over a Gaussian inter-
ference channel (IC); see Figure 1. We consider three different secrecy constraints: 1) K-user
interference channel with one external eavesdropper (IC-EE), where K transmitter-receiver
pairs wish to have secure communication against an external eavesdropper, see Figure 2(a).
2) K-user interference channel with confidential messages (IC-CM), where there are no ex-
ternal eavesdroppers, but each transmitter-receiver pair wishes to secure its communication
against the remaining K − 1 receivers, see Figure 2(b). 3) K-user interference channel with
confidential messages and one external eavesdropper (IC-CM-EE), which is a combination of
the previous two cases, where each transmitter-receiver pair wishes to secure its communi-
cation against the remaining K− 1 receivers and the external eavesdropper, see Figure 2(c).
In the Gaussian wiretap channel, the secrecy capacity is the difference between the chan-
nel capacities of the transmitter-receiver and the transmitter-eavesdropper pairs [4]. It is
well-known that this difference does not scale with the SNR, and hence the secure d.o.f. of
the Gaussian wiretap channel is zero, indicating a severe penalty due to secrecy in this
case. Fortunately, this does not hold in most multi-user scenarios, including the interference
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Figure 1: K-user Gaussian interference channel with secrecy constraints.
channel. Reference [28] showed that nested lattice codes and layered coding are useful in
providing positive sum secure d.o.f. for the K-user IC-CM; their result gave a sum secure
d.o.f. of less than 3
4
for K = 3. Reference [29] used interference alignment to achieve a sum
secure d.o.f. of K(K−2)
2K−2
for the K-user IC-CM, which gave 3
4
for K = 3. Based on the same
idea, [29, 30] achieved a sum secure d.o.f. of K(K−1)
2K
for the K-user IC-EE, which gave 1 for
K = 3. The approach used in [29,30] is basically to evaluate the secrecy performance of the
interference alignment technique [41] devised originally for the K-user interference channel
without any secrecy constraints. Since the original interference alignment scheme puts all
of the interfering signals into the same reduced-dimensionality sub-space at a receiver, it
naturally provides a certain amount of secrecy to those signals as an unintended byproduct,
because the interference signals in this sub-space create uncertainty for one another and
make it difficult for the receiver to decode them. However, since the end-goal of [41] is only
to achieve reliable decoding of the transmitted messages at their intended receivers, the d.o.f.
it provides is sub-optimal when both secrecy and reliability of messages are considered.
Recently, the exact sum secure d.o.f. of the two-user IC-CM was obtained to be 2
3
in [38].
This reference showed that while interference alignment is a key ingredient in achieving posi-
tive secure d.o.f., a more intricate design of the signals is needed to achieve the simultaneous
end-goals of reliability at the desired receivers and secrecy at the eavesdroppers. In partic-
ular, in [38], each transmitter sends both message carrying signals, as well as cooperative
jamming signals. This random mapping of the message carrying signals to the channel in-
puts via cooperative jamming signals may be interpreted as channel prefixing [3]. Both the
message carrying signals and the cooperative jamming signals come from the same discrete
alphabet, and hence are structured. In addition, the signals are carefully aligned at the
legitimate receivers and the eavesdroppers using real interference alignment [42]. In partic-
ular, at each receiver, the unintended message and both jamming signals are constrained
in the same interference sub-space, providing an interference-free sub-space for the intended
message. Further, inside the interference sub-space, each unintended message is protected
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Figure 2: The receiver sides of the three channel models: (a) K-user IC-EE, (b) K-user
IC-CM, and (c) K-user IC-CM-EE, where WK−i
△
= {W1, . . . ,Wi−1,Wi+1, . . . ,WK}.
by aligning it with the jamming signal from the other transmitter. Such a perfect alignment
provides a constant upper bound for the information leakage rate.
In this paper, we generalize the results in [38] to the case of K-user interference channel,
for K > 2. Our generalization has three main components:
1. While [38] considered IC-CM only, we consider both IC-CM and IC-EE and their com-
bination IC-CM-EE in a unified framework. To this end, we show converses separately
for IC-EE and IC-CM, which imply a converse for IC-CM-EE; and we show achievabil-
ity for IC-CM-EE, which implies achievability for IC-EE and IC-CM. The achievability
and converse meet giving an exact sum secure d.o.f. of K(K−1)
2K−1
for all three models.
2. For achievability: In the case of two-user IC-CM in [38], each message needs to be de-
livered reliably to one receiver and needs to be protected from another receiver. This
requires alignment at two receivers, which is achieved in [38] by simply choosing trans-
mission coefficients properly, which cannot be extended to the K-user case here. In the
K-user IC-CM-EE case, we need to deliver each message to a receiver, while protecting
it from K other receivers. This requires designing signals in order to achieve alignment
at K+1 receivers simultaneously: at one receiver (desired receiver) we need alignment
to ensure that the largest space is made available to message carrying signals for their
reliable decodability, and at K other receivers, we need to align cooperative jamming
signals with message carrying signals to protect them. These requirements create two
challenges: i) aligning multiple signals simultaneously at multiple receivers, and ii) up-
per bounding the information leakage rates by suitable functions which can be made
small. We overcome these challenges by using an asymptotical approach [43], where
we introduce many signals that carry each message and align them simultaneously at
multiple receivers only order-wise (i.e., align most of them, but not all of them), and
by developing a method to upper bound the information leakage rate by a function
which can be made small. In contrast to the constant upper bound for the information
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leakage rate in [38], here the upper bound is not constant, but a function which can
be made small. This is due to the non-perfect (i.e., only asymptotical) alignment.
3. For the converse: To the best of our knowledge, the only known upper bound for the
sum secure d.o.f. of theK-user interference channel with secrecy constraints is K
2
, which
is the upper bound with no secrecy constraints [41]. The upper bounding technique
for the two-user IC-CM in [38] considers one single confidential message against the
corresponding unintended receiver each time, since in that case the eavesdropping
relationship is straightforward: for each message there is only one eavesdropper and
for each eavesdropper there is only one confidential message. However, in the case of
K-user IC, each message is required to be kept secret against multiple eavesdroppers
and each eavesdropper is associated with multiple unintended messages. To develop
a tight converse, we focus on the eavesdropper as opposed to the message. In the
converse for IC-EE, we consider the sum rate of all of the messages eavesdropped by
the external eavesdropper. We sequentially apply the role of a helper lemma in [38] to
each transmitter by treating its signal as a helper to another specific transmitter. In
the converse for IC-CM, for each receiver (which also is an eavesdropper), we consider
the sum rate of all unintended messages, and again apply the role of a helper lemma
in a specific structure.
2 System Model, Definitions and the Result
The input-output relationships for a K-user Gaussian interference channel with secrecy con-
straints (Figure 1) are given by
Yi =
K∑
j=1
hjiXj +Ni, i = 1, . . . , K (1)
Z =
K∑
j=1
gjXj +NZ (2)
where Yi is the channel output of receiver i, Z is the channel output of the external eaves-
dropper (if there is any), Xi is the channel input of transmitter i, hji is the channel gain
of the jth transmitter to the ith receiver, gj is the channel gain of the jth transmitter to
the eavesdropper (if there is any), and {N1, . . . , NK , NZ} are mutually independent zero-
mean unit-variance Gaussian random variables. All the channel gains are time-invariant,
and independently drawn from continuous distributions. We further assume that all hji are
non-zero, and all gj are non-zero if there is an external eavesdropper. All channel inputs
satisfy average power constraints, E [X2i ] ≤ P , for i = 1, . . . , K.
Each transmitter i intends to send a message Wi, uniformly chosen from a set Wi, to
receiver i. The rate of the message is Ri
△
= 1
n
log |Wi|, where n is the number of channel
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uses. Transmitter i uses a stochastic function fi : Wi → Xi to encode the message, where
Xi
△
= Xni is the n-length channel input of user i. We use boldface letters to denote n-length
vector signals, e.g., Xi
△
= Xni , Yj
△
= Y nj , Z
△
= Zn, etc. The legitimate receiver j decodes
the message as Wˆj based on its observation Yj. A rate tuple (R1, . . . , RK) is said to be
achievable if for any ǫ > 0, there exist joint n-length codes such that each receiver j can
decode the corresponding message reliably, i.e., the probability of decoding error is less than
ǫ for all messages,
max
j
Pr
[
Wj 6= Wˆj
]
≤ ǫ (3)
and the corresponding secrecy requirement is satisfied. We consider three different secrecy
requirements:
1) In IC-EE, Figure 2(a), all of the messages are kept information-theoretically secure
against the external eavesdropper,
H(W1, . . . ,WK |Z) ≥ H(W1, . . . ,WK)− nǫ (4)
2) In IC-CM, Figure 2(b), all unintended messages are kept information-theoretically
secure against each receiver,
H(WK−i|Yi) ≥ H(W
K
−i)− nǫ, i = 1, . . . , K (5)
where WK−i
△
= {W1, . . . ,Wi−1,Wi+1, . . . ,WK}.
3) In IC-CM-EE, Figure 2(c), all of the messages are kept information-theoretically secure
against both the K−1 unintended receivers and the eavesdropper, i.e., we impose both
secrecy constraints in (4) and (5).
The supremum of all sum achievable secrecy rates is the sum secrecy capacity Cs,Σ, and
the sum secure d.o.f., Ds,Σ, is defined as
Ds,Σ
△
= lim
P→∞
Cs,Σ
1
2
logP
= lim
P→∞
sup
R1 + · · ·+RK
1
2
logP
(6)
The main result of this paper is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 The sum secure d.o.f. of the K-user IC-EE, IC-CM, and IC-CM-EE is K(K−1)
2K−1
for almost all channel gains.
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3 Preliminaries
3.1 Role of a Helper Lemma
For completeness, we repeat Lemma 2 in [38] here, which is called role of a helper lemma. This
lemma identifies a constraint on the signal of a given transmitter, based on the decodability
of another transmitter’s message at its intended receiver.
Lemma 1 ([38]) For reliable decoding of the kth transmitter’s signal at the kth receiver,
the channel input of transmitter i 6= k, Xi, must satisfy
h(Xi + N˜) ≤ h(Yk)− nRk + nc (7)
where c is a constant which does not depend on P , and N˜ is a new Gaussian random variable
independent of all other random variables with σ2
N˜
< 1
h2
ik
, and N˜ is an i.i.d. sequence of N˜ .
Lemma 1 gives an upper bound on the differential entropy of (a noisy version of) the
signal of any given transmitter, transmitter i in (7), in terms of the differential entropy of the
channel output and the message rate nRk = H(Wk), of a user k, based on the decodability of
message Wk at its intended receiver. The inequality in this lemma, (7), can alternatively be
interpreted as an upper bound on the message rate, i.e., on nRk, in terms of the difference
of the differential entropies of the channel output of a receiver k and the channel input
of a transmitter i; in particular, the higher the differential entropy of the signal coming
from user i, the lower this upper bound will be on the rate of user k. This motivates not
using i.i.d. Gaussian signals which have the highest differential entropy. Also note that this
lemma does not involve any secrecy constraints, and is based only on the decodability of the
messages at their intended receivers.
3.2 Real Interference Alignment
3.2.1 Pulse Amplitude Modulation
For a point-to-point scalar Gaussian channel,
Y = X + Z (8)
with additive Gaussian noise Z ∼ N (0, σ2) and an input power constraint E [X2] ≤ P ,
assume that the input symbols are drawn from a PAM constellation,
C(a,Q) = a{−Q,−Q + 1, . . . , Q− 1, Q} (9)
where Q is a positive integer and a is a real number to normalize the transmit power. Note
that, a is also the minimum distance dmin(C) of this constellation, which has the probability
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of error
Pr(e) ≤ exp
(
−
d2min
8σ2
)
= exp
(
−
a2
8σ2
)
(10)
The transmission rate of this PAM scheme is
R = log(2Q+ 1) (11)
since there are 2Q + 1 signalling points in the constellation. For any small enough δ > 0, if
we choose Q = P
1−δ
2 and a = γP
δ
2 , where γ is a constant to normalize the transmit power,
which is independent of P , then
Pr(e) ≤ exp
(
−
γ2P δ
8σ2
)
and R ≥
1− δ
2
logP (12)
and we can have Pr(e) → 0 and R → 1
2
logP as P → ∞. That is, we can have reliable
communication at rates approaching 1
2
logP , and therefore have 1 d.o.f.
3.2.2 Real Interference Alignment
This PAM scheme for the point-to-point scalar channel can be generalized to multiple data
streams. Let the transmit signal be
x = aTb =
L∑
i=1
aibi (13)
where a1, . . . , aL are rationally independent real numbers
1 and each bi is drawn independently
from the constellation C(a,Q) in (9). The real value x is a combination of L data streams,
and the constellation observed at the receiver consists of (2Q+ 1)L signal points.
By using the Khintchine-Groshev theorem of Diophantine approximation in number the-
ory, [42,43] bounded the minimum distance dmin of points in the receiver’s constellation: For
any δ > 0, there exists a constant kδ, such that
dmin ≥
kδa
QL−1+δ
(14)
for almost all rationally independent {ai}Li=1, except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero. Since
the minimum distance of the receiver constellation is lower bounded, with proper choice of
a and Q, the probability of error can be made arbitrarily small, with rate R approaching
1
2
logP . This result is stated in the following lemma.
1 a1, . . . , aL are rationally independent if whenever q1, . . . , qL are rational numbers then
∑L
i=1
qiai = 0
implies qi = 0 for all i.
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Lemma 2 ([42, 43]) For any small enough δ > 0, there exists a positive constant γ, which
is independent of P , such that if we choose
Q = P
1−δ
2(L+δ) and a = γ
P
1
2
Q
(15)
then the average power constraint is satisfied, i.e., E [X2] ≤ P , and for almost all {ai}Li=1,
except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero, the probability of error is bounded by
Pr(e) ≤ exp
(
−ηγP
δ
)
(16)
where ηγ is a positive constant which is independent of P .
Furthermore, as a simple extension, if bi are sampled independently from different con-
stellations Ci(a,Qi), the lower bound in (14) can be modified as
dmin ≥
kǫa
(maxiQi)L−1+ǫ
(17)
4 Converse for IC-EE
In this section, we develop a converse for the K-user IC-EE (see Figure 2(a)) defined in (1)
and (2) with the secrecy constraint (4). We start with the sum rate:
n
K∑
i=1
Ri =
K∑
i=1
H(Wi) = H(W
K
1 ) (18)
≤ I(WK1 ;Y
K
1 )− I(W
K
1 ;Z) + nc0 (19)
≤ I(WK1 ;Y
K
1 ,Z)− I(W
K
1 ;Z) + nc0 (20)
= I(WK1 ;Y
K
1 |Z) + nc0 (21)
≤ I(XK1 ;Y
K
1 |Z) + nc0 (22)
= h(YK1 |Z)− h(Y
K
1 |Z,X
K
1 ) + nc0 (23)
= h(YK1 |Z)− h(N
K
1 |Z,X
K
1 ) + nc0 (24)
≤ h(YK1 |Z) + nc1 (25)
= h(YK1 ,Z)− h(Z) + nc1 (26)
where WK1
△
= {Wj}Kj=1, X
K
1
△
= {Xj}Kj=1, Y
K
1
△
= {Yj}Kj=1, and all the cis in this paper are
constants which do not depend on P .
For each j, we introduce X˜j = Xj+N˜j, where N˜j is an i.i.d. sequence of N˜j which is a zero-
mean Gaussian random variable with variance σ2j < min(mini 1/h
2
ji, 1/g
2
j ). Also, {N˜j}
K
j=1 are
mutually independent, and are independent of all other random variables. Continuing from
9
(26),
n
K∑
i=1
Ri ≤ h(X˜
K
1 ,Y
K
1 ,Z)− h(X˜
K
1 |Y
K
1 ,Z)− h(Z) + nc1 (27)
≤ h(X˜K1 ,Y
K
1 ,Z)− h(X˜
K
1 |X
K
1 ,Y
K
1 ,Z)− h(Z) + nc1 (28)
= h(X˜K1 ,Y
K
1 ,Z)− h(N˜
K
1 )− h(Z) + nc1 (29)
≤ h(X˜K1 ,Y
K
1 ,Z)− h(Z) + nc2 (30)
= h(X˜K1 ) + h(Y
K
1 ,Z|X˜
K
1 )− h(Z) + nc2 (31)
≤ h(X˜K1 )− h(Z) + nc3 (32)
where X˜K1
△
= {X˜j}Kj=1, and the last inequality is due to the fact that h(Y
K
1 ,Z|X˜
K
1 ) ≤ nc
′,
i.e., given all the channel inputs (disturbed by small Gaussian noises), the channel outputs
can be reconstructed, which is shown as follows
h(YK1 ,Z|X˜
K
1 )
≤
[
K∑
j=1
h(Yj|X˜
K
1 )
]
+ h(Z|X˜K1 ) (33)
=
[
K∑
j=1
h
(
K∑
i=1
hij(X˜i − N˜i) +Nj
∣∣∣∣∣X˜K1
)]
+ h
(
K∑
i=1
gi(X˜i − N˜i) +NZ
∣∣∣∣∣X˜K1
)
(34)
=
[
K∑
j=1
h
(
−
K∑
i=1
hijN˜i +Nj
∣∣∣∣∣X˜K1
)]
+ h
(
−
K∑
i=1
giN˜i +NZ
∣∣∣∣∣X˜K1
)
(35)
≤
[
K∑
j=1
h
(
−
K∑
i=1
hijN˜i +Nj
)]
+ h
(
−
K∑
i=1
giN˜i +NZ
)
(36)
△
= nc4 (37)
Next, we note
h(X˜j) ≤ h(gjXj +NZ) + nc5 ≤ h(Z) + nc5, j = 1, . . . , K (38)
where the inequalities are due to the differential entropy version of [44, Problem 2.14]. In-
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serting (38) into (32), for any j = 1, . . . , K, we get
n
K∑
i=1
Ri ≤ h(X˜
K
1 )− h(Z) + nc3 (39)
≤
K∑
i=1
h(X˜i)− h(Z) + nc3 (40)
≤
K∑
i=1,i 6=j
h(X˜i) + nc6 (41)
which means that the net effect of the presence of an eavesdropper is to eliminate one of the
channel inputs; we call this the secrecy penalty.
We apply the role of a helper lemma, Lemma 1, to each X˜i with k = i + 1 (for i = K,
k = 1), in (41) as
n
K∑
i=1
Ri ≤ h(X˜1) + h(X˜2) + · · ·+ h(X˜j−1) + h(X˜j+1) + · · ·+ h(X˜K) + nc7 (42)
≤ [h(Y2)− nR2] + [h(Y3)− nR3] + · · ·+ [h(Yj)− nRj ]
+ [h(Yj+2)− nRj+2] + · · ·+ [h(YK)− nRK ] + [h(Y1)− nR1] + nc8 (43)
By noting that h(Yi) ≤
n
2
logP + nc′i for each i, we have
2n
K∑
i=1
Ri ≤ (K − 1)
(n
2
logP
)
+ nR(j+1) mod K + nc9 (44)
for j = 1, . . . , K. Therefore, we have a total of K bounds in (44) for j = 1, . . . , K. Summing
these K bounds, we obtain:
(2K − 1)n
K∑
i=1
Ri ≤ K(K − 1)
(n
2
logP
)
+ nc10 (45)
which gives
Ds,Σ ≤
K(K − 1)
2K − 1
(46)
completing the converse for IC-EE.
5 Converse for IC-CM
In this section, we develop a converse for the K-user IC-CM (see Figure 2(b)). We focus on
the secrecy constraint (5) at a single receiver, say j, as an eavesdropper, and start with the
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sum rate corresponding to all unintended messages at receiver j:
n
K∑
i=1,i 6=j
Ri =
K∑
i=1,i 6=j
H(Wi) = H(W
K
−j) (47)
≤ I(WK−j;Y
K
−j)− I(W
K
−j ;Yj) + nc11 (48)
≤ I(WK−j;Y
K
−j,Yj)− I(W
K
−j;Yj) + nc11 (49)
= I(WK−j;Y
K
−j|Yj) + nc11 (50)
≤ I(XK−j;Y
K
−j|Yj) + nc11 (51)
= h(YK−j|Yj)− h(Y
K
−j|Yj,X
K
−j) + nc11 (52)
≤ h(YK−j|Yj)− h(Y
K
−j|Yj,X
K
1 ) + nc11 (53)
= h(YK−j|Yj)− h(N
K
−j|Yj,X
K
1 ) + nc11 (54)
≤ h(YK−j|Yj) + nc12 (55)
= h(YK−j,Yj)− h(Yj) + nc12 (56)
= h(YK1 )− h(Yj) + nc12 (57)
where WK−j
△
= {Wi}Ki=1,i 6=j is the message set containing all unintended messages with respect
to receiver j, XK−j
△
= {Xi}Ki=1,i 6=j and Y
K
−j
△
= {Yi}Ki=1,i 6=j.
For each j, we introduce X˜j = Xj + N˜j, where N˜j is an i.i.d. sequence of N˜j which is
a zero-mean Gaussian random variable with variance σ2j < mini 1/h
2
ji. Also, {N˜j}
K
j=1 are
mutually independent, and are independent of all other random variables. Continuing from
(57),
n
K∑
i=1,i 6=j
Ri ≤ h(X˜
K
1 ,Y
K
1 )− h(X˜
K
1 |Y
K
1 )− h(Yj) + nc12 (58)
≤ h(X˜K1 ,Y
K
1 )− h(X˜
K
1 |Y
K
1 ,X
K
1 )− h(Yj) + nc12 (59)
= h(X˜K1 ,Y
K
1 )− h(N˜
K
1 )− h(Yj) + nc12 (60)
≤ h(X˜K1 ,Y
K
1 )− h(Yj) + nc13 (61)
= h(X˜K1 ) + h(Y
K
1 |X˜
K
1 )− h(Yj) + nc13 (62)
≤ h(X˜K1 )− h(Yj) + nc14 (63)
where the last inequality is due to the fact that h(YK1 |X˜
K
1 ) ≤ nc
′, i.e., given all the channel
inputs (disturbed by small Gaussian noises), the channel outputs can be reconstructed, which
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is shown as follows
h(YK1 |X˜
K
1 ) ≤
K∑
j=1
h(Yj |X˜
K
1 ) (64)
=
K∑
j=1
h
(
K∑
i=1
hij(X˜i − N˜i) +Nj
∣∣∣∣∣X˜K1
)
(65)
=
K∑
j=1
h
(
−
K∑
i=1
hijN˜i +Nj
∣∣∣∣∣X˜K1
)
(66)
≤
K∑
j=1
h
(
−
K∑
i=1
hijN˜i +Nj
)
(67)
△
= nc15 (68)
We apply the role of a helper lemma, Lemma 1, to each X˜i with k = i + 1 (for i = K,
k = 1), in (63) as
n
K∑
i=1,i 6=j
Ri ≤ h(X˜
K
1 )− h(Yj) + nc14 (69)
≤
K∑
i=1
h(X˜i)− h(Yj) + nc14 (70)
≤
K−1∑
i=1
[
h(Yi+1)− nRi+1
]
+
[
h(Y1)− nR1
]
− h(Yj) + nc16 (71)
=
K∑
i=1
[
h(Yi)− nRi
]
− h(Yj) + nc16 (72)
By noting that h(Yi) ≤
n
2
logP + nc′i for each i, we have
nRj + 2n
K∑
i=1,i 6=j
Ri ≤
K∑
i=1,i 6=j
h(Yi) + nc16 (73)
≤ (K − 1)
(n
2
logP
)
+ nc17 (74)
for j = 1, . . . , K. Therefore, we have a total of K bounds in (74) for j = 1, . . . , K. Summing
these K bounds, we obtain:
(2K − 1)n
K∑
i=1
Ri ≤ K(K − 1)
(n
2
logP
)
+ nc18 (75)
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which gives
Ds,Σ ≤
K(K − 1)
2K − 1
(76)
completing the converse for IC-CM.
6 Achievability
In this section, we provide achievability for the K-user IC-CM-EE (see Figure 2(c)), which
will imply achievability for K-user IC-EE and K-user IC-CM. We will prove that, for almost
all channel gains, a sum secure d.o.f. lower bound of
Ds,Σ ≥
K(K − 1)
2K − 1
(77)
is achievable for the K-user IC-CM-EE.
6.1 Background
In this section, we will summarize the achievability scheme for the two-user IC-CM in [38],
motivate the need for simultaneous alignment of multiple signals at multiple receivers in this
K-user case, and provide an example of simultaneously aligning two signals at two receivers
via asymptotic real alignment [43]. We provide the general achievable scheme for K > 2
in Section 6.2 via cooperative jamming and asymptotic real alignment, and show that it
achieves the sum secure d.o.f. in (77) via a detailed performance analysis in Section 6.3.
In the achievable scheme for K = 2 in [38], four mutually independent discrete random
variables {V1, U1, V2, U2} are employed (see Figure 10 in [38]). Each of them is uniformly
and independently drawn from the discrete constellation C(a,Q) given in (9). The role
of Vi is to carry message Wi, and the role of Ui is to cooperatively jam receiver i to help
transmitter-receiver pair j, where j 6= i, for i, j = 1, 2. By carefully selecting the transmit
coefficients, U1 and V2 are aligned at receiver 1, and U2 and V1 are aligned at receiver 2; and
therefore, U1 protects V2, and U2 protects V1. By this signalling scheme, information leakage
rates are upper bounded by constants, and the message rates are made to scale with power
P , reaching the secure d.o.f. capacity of the two-user IC-CM which is 2
3
.
Here, for the K-user IC-CM-EE, we employ a total of K2 random variables,
Vij, i, j = 1, . . . , K, j 6= i (78)
Uk, k = 1, . . . , K (79)
which are illustrated in Figure 3 for the case of K = 3. The scheme proposed here has two
major differences from [38]: 1) Instead of using a single random variable to carry a message,
14
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Figure 3: Illustration of alignment for 3-user IC-CM-EE. U1 and V21 are marked to emphasize
their simultaneous alignment at Y1, Y3 and Z.
we use a total of K − 1 random variables to carry each message. For transmitter i, K − 1
random variables {Vij}j 6=i, each representing a sub-message, collectively carry message Wi.
2) Rather than protecting one message at one receiver, each Uk simultaneously protects a
portion of all sub-messages at all required receivers. More specifically, Uk protects {Vik}i 6=k,i 6=j
at receivers j, and at the eavesdropper (if there is any). For example, in Figure 3, U1
protects V21 and V31 where necessary. In particular, U1 protects V21 at receivers 1, 3 and
the eavesdropper; and it protects V31 at receivers 1, 2 and the eavesdropper. As a technical
challenge, this requires U1 to be aligned with the same signal, say V21, at multiple receivers
simultaneously, i.e., at receivers 1, 3 and the eavesdropper. These particular alignments are
circled by ellipsoids in Figure 3. We do these simultaneous alignments using asymptotic real
alignment technique proposed in [43] and used in [30, 36].
For illustration purposes, in the rest of this section, we demonstrate how we can align
two signals at two receivers simultaneously; in particular, we will align U1 with V21 at Y1 and
Y3, simultaneously. Towards this end, we will further divide the random variable V21, which
represents a sub-message, into a large number of random variables denoted as V21
△
= {v21t :
t = 1, . . . , |T1|}. We then send each one of these random variables after multiplying it with
one of the coefficients in the following set which serves as the set of dimensions :
T1 =
{
hr1111 h
r21
21 h
r13
13 h
r23
23 : r11, r21, r13, r23 ∈ {1, . . . , m}
}
(80)
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Figure 4: Illustration of alignment at multiple receivers.
where m is a large constant. To perform the alignment, we let U1 have the same detailed
structure as V21, i.e., U1 is also divided into a large number of random variables as U1
△
= {u1t :
t = 1, . . . , |T1|}. At receiver 1, the elements of U1 from transmitter 1 occupy the dimensions
h11T1 and the elements of V21 from transmitter 2 occupy the dimensions h21T1. Although
these two sets are not the same, their intersection contains nearly as many elements as T1,
i.e.,
|h11T1 ∩ h21T1| = m
2(m− 1)2 ≈ m4 = |T1| (81)
when m is large, i.e., almost all elements of U1 and V21 are asymptotically aligned at receiver
1. The same argument applies for receiver 3. At receiver 3, the elements of U1 from trans-
mitter 1 occupy the dimensions h13T1 and the elements of V21 from transmitter 2 occupy
the dimensions h23T1. Again, although these two sets are not the same, their intersection
contains nearly as many elements as T1. Therefore, almost all elements of U1 and V21 are
aligned at receivers 1 and 3, simultaneously. These simultaneous alignments are depicted in
Figure 4. In the following section, we use this basic idea to align multiple signals at multiple
receivers simultaneously. This will require a more intricate design of signals and dimensions.
6.2 General Achievable Scheme via Asymptotic Alignment
Here, we give the general achievable scheme for the K-user IC-CM-EE. Let m be a large
constant. Let us define sets Ti, for i = 1, . . . , K, which will represent dimensions as follows:
Ti
△
=
{
hriiii
(
K∏
j,k=1,j 6=k
h
rjk
jk
)(
K∏
j=1
g
sj
j
)
: rjk, sj ∈ {1, . . . , m}
}
(82)
Let Mi be the cardinality of Ti. Note that all Mi are the same, thus we denote them as M ,
M
△
= m1+K(K−1)+K = mK
2+1 (83)
For each transmitter i, for j 6= i, let tij be the vector containing all the elements in the
set Tj . Therefore, tij is an M-dimensional vector containing M rationally independent real
numbers in Tj . The sets tij will represent the dimensions along which message signals are
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transmitted. In particular, for any given (i, j) with i 6= j, tij will represent the dimensions
in which message signal Vij is transmitted. In addition, for each transmitter i, let t(i) be
the vector containing all the elements in the set Ti. Therefore, t(i) is an M-dimensional
vector containing M rationally independent real numbers in Ti. The sets t(i) will represent
the dimensions along which cooperative jamming signals are transmitted. In particular, for
any given i, t(i) will represent the dimensions in which cooperative jamming signal Ui is
transmitted. Let us define a KM dimensional vector bi by stacking tij and t(i) as
bTi =
[
tTi1, . . . , t
T
i,i−1, t
T
i,i+1, . . . , t
T
iK , t
T
(i)
]
(84)
Then, transmitter i generates a vector ai, which contains a total of KM discrete signals
each identically and independently drawn from C(a,Q). For convenience, we partition this
transmitted signal as
aTi =
[
vTi1, . . . ,v
T
i,i−1,v
T
i,i+1, . . . ,v
T
iK ,u
T
i
]
(85)
where vij represents the information symbols in Vij, and ui represents the cooperative jam-
ming signal in Ui. Each of these vectors has length M , and therefore, the total length of ai
is KM . The channel input of transmitter i is
xi = a
T
i bi (86)
Before we investigate the performance of this signalling scheme in Section 6.3, we analyze
the structure of the received signal at the receivers. Without loss of generality we will focus
on receiver 1; by symmetry, a similar structure will exist at all other receivers. We observe
that in addition to the additive Gaussian noise, receiver 1 receives all the vectors vjk for
all j, k (j 6= k) and ui for all i. All of these signals get multiplied with the corresponding
channel gains before they arrive at receiver 1. Due to the specific signalling structure used at
the transmitters, and the multiplications with different channel gains over the wireless com-
munication channel, the signals arrive at the receiver lying in various different dimensions.
To see the detailed structure of the received signals at the receivers, let us define T˜i as a
superset of Ti, as follows
T˜i
△
=
{
hriiii
(
K∏
j,k=1,j 6=k
h
rjk
jk
)(
K∏
j=1
g
sj
j
)
: rjk, sj ∈ {1, . . . , m+ 1}
}
(87)
The information symbols coming from transmitter 1 are in vectors v12,v13, . . . ,v1K which
are multiplied by coefficients in t12, t13, . . . , t1K before they are sent. These coefficients
come from sets T2, T3, . . . , TK , respectively. After going through the channel, all of these
coefficients get multiplied by h11. Therefore, the receiving coefficients of v12,v13, . . . ,v1K
are h11t12, h11t13, . . . , h11t1K , which are the dimensions in the sets h11T2, h11T3, . . . , h11TK ,
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respectively. By construction, since each Ti has powers of hii in it (but no hjj), these
dimensions are separate. These correspond to separate boxes of V12 and V13 at receiver 1 in
Figure 3 for the example case of K = 3.
On the other hand, all of the cooperative jamming signals from all of the transmit-
ters u1,u2, . . . ,uK come to receiver 1 with received coefficients h11t(1), h21t(2), . . . , hK1t(K),
which are the dimensions in the sets h11T1, h21T2, . . . , hK1TK , respectively. We note that all
of these dimensions are separate among themselves, and they are separate from the dimen-
sions of the message signals coming from transmitter 1. That is, all of the dimensions in
h11T2, h11T3, . . . , h11TK and h11T1, h21T2, . . . , hK1TK are all mutually different, again owing
to the fact that each Ti contains powers of hii in it. These correspond to separate boxes of
V12, V13, U1, U2 and U3 at receiver 1 in Figure 3 for the example case of K = 3.
Next, we note that each ui is aligned together with all of the vji coming from the jth
transmitter, with j 6= i and j 6= 1, at receiver 1. Note that ui occupies dimensions hi1Ti and
vji (for any j 6= i and j 6= 1) occupies dimensions hj1Ti at receiver 1. From the arguments in
Section 6.1, ui and vji (with j 6= i and j 6= 1) are asymptotically aligned. More formally, we
note that ui occupies dimensions hi1Ti which is contained in T˜i. Similarly, all vji, with j 6= i
and j 6= 1, occupy dimensions hj1Ti, respectively, which are all contained in T˜i. Therefore,
ui and all vji (with j 6= i and j 6= 1) are all aligned along T˜i. These alignments are shown
as U1 being aligned with V21 and V31; U2 being aligned with V32; and U3 being aligned with
V23 at receiver 1 in Figure 3 for the example case of K = 3. Further, we note that, since
only Ti and T˜i contain powers of hii, the dimensions h11T2, h11T3, . . . , h11TK , T˜1, T˜2, . . . , T˜K
are all separable. This implies that all the elements in the set
R1
△
=
(
K⋃
j=2
h11Tj
)⋃( K⋃
j=2
T˜j
)⋃
T˜1 (88)
are rationally independent, and thereby the cardinality of R1 is
MR
△
= |R1| = (K − 1)m
1+K(K−1)+K +K(m+ 1)1+K(K−1)+K (89)
= (K − 1)mK
2+1 +K(m+ 1)K
2+1 (90)
6.3 Performance Analysis
We will compute the secrecy rates achievable with the asymptotic alignment based scheme
proposed in Section 6.2 by using the following theorem.
Theorem 2 For K-user interference channels with confidential messages and one external
eavesdropper, the following rate region is achievable
Ri ≥ I(Vi; Yi)− max
j∈K0,−i
I(Vi; Yj|V
K
−i), i = 1, . . . , K (91)
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where for convenience we denote Z by Y0, V
K
−i
△
= {Vj}Kj=1,j 6=i and K0,−i = {0, 1, . . . , i− 1, i+
1, . . . , K}. The auxiliary random variables {Vi}Ki=1 are mutually independent, and for each
i, we have the following Markov chain Vi → Xi → (Y1, . . . , YK).
In developing the achievable rates in Theorem 2, we focus on a single transmitter, say i,
and consider the compound setting associated with message Wi, where this message needs to
be secured against a total of K eavesdroppers, with K−1 of them being the other legitimate
receivers (j 6= i) and the remaining one being the external eavesdropper (j = 0). A proof of
this theorem is given in Appendix A.
We apply Theorem 2 to our alignment based scheme proposed in Section 6.2 by selecting
Vi used in (91) as
Vi
△
= (vTi1, . . . ,v
T
i,i−1,v
T
i,i+1, . . . ,v
T
iK) (92)
for i = 1, . . . , K. For any δ > 0, if we choose Q = P
1−δ
2(MR+δ) and a = γP
1
2
Q
, based on Lemma 2,
the probability of error of estimating Vi based on Yi can be upper bounded by a function
decreasing exponentially fast in P , by choosing a γ, a positive constant independent of P to
normalize the average power of the input signals, as
0 < γ ≤
1∑
t∈bi
|t|
=
1∑K
i=1
∑
ti∈Ti
|ti|
(93)
Furthermore, by Fano’s inequality, we can conclude that
I(Vi; Yi) ≥
(K − 1)mK
2+1(1− δ)
MR + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (94)
=
(K − 1)(1− δ)
K − 1 +K
(
1 + 1
m
)K2+1
+ δ
mK
2+1
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (95)
where o(·) is the little-o function. This provides a lower bound for the first term in (91).
Next, we need to derive an upper bound for the second item in (91), i.e, the secrecy
penalty. For any i ∈ K = {1, . . . , K} and j ∈ K−i = {1, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , K}, by the
Markov chain Vi → (
∑K
k=1 hkjXkj, V
K
−i)→ Yj,
I(Vi; Yj|V
K
−i) ≤ I
(
Vi;
K∑
k=1
hkjXk
∣∣∣V K−i
)
(96)
= H
(
K∑
k=1
hkjXk
∣∣∣V K−i
)
−H
(
K∑
k=1
hkjXk
∣∣∣V K1
)
(97)
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where V K1 = {V1, . . . , VK}. The first term in (97) can be rewritten as
H
(
K∑
k=1
hkjXk
∣∣∣V K−i
)
= H


K∑
k=1
hkju
T
k t(k) +
K∑
k=1
k 6=i
hijv
T
iktik

 (98)
= H

hijuTi t(i) +
K∑
k=1
k 6=i
[
hijv
T
iktik + hkju
T
k t(k)
] (99)
Note that, for a given k, the vectors tik and t(k) represent the same dimensions Tk, and
hij , hkj ∈ Tk for all k 6= i, which implies that hijTk, hkjTk ∈ T˜k. In addition, for each k, we
note that a large part of the two sets hijTk and hkjTk are the same, i.e.,∣∣∣hijTk⋂hkjTk∣∣∣ = mK2−1(m− 1)2 △=Mδ (100)
Therefore, the first term in (97) can be further upper bounded as
H
(
K∑
k=1
hkjXk
∣∣∣V K−i
)
= H

hijuTi t(i) +
K∑
k=1
k 6=i
[
hijv
T
iktik + hkju
T
k t(k)
] (101)
≤ log
[
(2Q+ 1)M(4Q+ 1)(K−1)Mδ(2Q+ 1)2(K−1)(M−Mδ)
]
(102)
≤ log
[
QM+(K−1)Mδ+2(K−1)(M−Mδ)
]
+ o(logP ) (103)
≤
[M + (K − 1)Mδ + 2(K − 1)(M −Mδ)] (1− δ)
(K − 1)mK2+1 +K(m+ 1)K2+1 + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (104)
≤
{
1 + (K − 1)
(
1− 1
m
)2
+ 2(K − 1)
[
1−
(
1− 1
m
)2]}
(1− δ)
K − 1 +K
(
1 + 1
m
)K2+1
+ δ
mK
2+1
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (105)
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The second term in (97) is exactly the entropy of {uk}Kk=1 vectors, i.e.,
H
(
K∑
k=1
hkjXk|V
K
1
)
= H
(
K∑
k=1
hkju
T
k t(k)
)
(106)
= log(2Q+ 1)KM (107)
=
KmK
2+1(1− δ)
(K − 1)mK2+1 +K(m+ 1)K2+1 + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (108)
=
K(1− δ)
K − 1 +K
(
1 + 1
m
)K2+1
+ δ
mK
2+1
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (109)
Substituting (105) and (109) into (97), we get
I(Vi; Yj|V
K
−i) ≤ H
(
K∑
k=1
hkjXk
∣∣∣V K−i
)
−H
(
K∑
k=1
hkjXk
∣∣∣V K1
)
(110)
≤
{
1 + (K − 1)
(
1− 1
m
)2
+ 2(K − 1)
[
1−
(
1− 1
m
)2]
−K
}
(1− δ)
K − 1 +K
(
1 + 1
m
)K2+1
+ δ
mK
2+1
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (111)
≤
K 2m−1
m2
(1− δ)
K − 1 +K
(
1 + 1
m
)K2+1
+ δ
mK
2+1
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (112)
We note that by choosing m large enough, the factor before the 1
2
logP term can be made
arbitrarily small. Due to the non-perfect (i.e., only asymptotical) alignment, the upper
bound for the information leakage rate is not a constant as in [38], but a function which can
be made to approach zero d.o.f.
For any i ∈ K and j = 0, i.e., Y0 = Z the external eavesdropper, we should derive a new
upper bound for the second term in (97), i.e., I(Vi;Z|V K−i). By similar steps, we have
I(Vi;Z|V
K
−i) ≤ I
(
Vi;
K∑
k=1
gkXk
∣∣∣V K−i
)
(113)
= H
(
K∑
k=1
gkXk
∣∣∣V K−i
)
−H
(
K∑
k=1
gkXk
∣∣∣V K1
)
(114)
= H
(
K∑
k=1
gkXk
∣∣∣V K−i
)
−H
(
K∑
k=1
gku
T
k t(k)
)
(115)
= H
(
K∑
k=1
gkXk
∣∣∣V K−i
)
− log(2Q + 1)KM (116)
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Here, we need to upper bound the first item in (116). We first observe that
H
(
K∑
k=1
gkXk
∣∣∣V K−i
)
= H


K∑
k=1
gku
T
k t(k) +
K∑
k=1
k 6=i
giv
T
iktik

 (117)
= H

giuTi t(i) +
K∑
k=1
k 6=i
[
gku
T
k t(k) + giv
T
iktik
] (118)
Firstly, note that, t(k) and tik represent the same set Tk. Therefore, for different k, the
dimensions are distinguishable. Secondly, due to reasons similar to (100), we conclude that
H
(
K∑
k=1
gkXk
∣∣∣V K−i
)
= H

giuTi t(i) +
K∑
k=1
k 6=i
[
gku
T
k t(k) + giv
T
iktik
]

 (119)
≤ log
[
(2Q+ 1)M(4Q+ 1)(K−1)Mδ(2Q+ 1)2(K−1)(M−Mδ)
]
(120)
≤ log
[
QM+(K−1)Mδ+2(K−1)(M−Mδ)
]
+ o(logP ) (121)
≤
[M + (K − 1)Mδ + 2(K − 1)(M −Mδ)] (1− δ)
(K − 1)mK2+1 +K(m+ 1)K2+1 + δ
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (122)
Substituting (122) into (116), we attain an upper bound which is the same as the upper
bound for I(Vi; Yj|V K−i), i.e.,
I(Vi;Z|V
K
−i) ≤
K 2m−1
m2
(1− δ)
K − 1 +K
(
1 + 1
m
)K2+1
+ δ
mK
2+1
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (123)
Substituting (95), (112), and (123) into (91), we obtain a lower bound for the achievable
secrecy rate Ri as
Ri ≥
[
(K − 1)−K
(
2m−1
m2
)]
(1− δ)
K − 1 +K
(
1 + 1
m
)K2+1
+ δ
mK
2+1
(
1
2
logP
)
+ o(logP ) (124)
By choosing m → ∞ and δ → 0, we can achieve secrecy sum rates arbitrarily close to
K−1
2K−1
(
1
2
logP
)
, thereby achieving the sum secure d.o.f. lower bound in (77).
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied secure communications in K-user Gaussian interference networks
from an information-theoretic point of view, and addressed three important channel models:
IC-EE, IC-CM and their combination IC-CM-EE in a unified framework. We showed that,
for all three models, the sum secure d.o.f. is exactly K(K−1)
2K−1
. Our achievability is based on
structured signalling, structured cooperative jamming, channel prefixing and asymptotic real
interference alignment. The key insight of the achievability is to carefully design the structure
of all of the signals at the transmitters so that the signals are received at both legitimate
receivers and eavesdroppers in most desirable manner from a secure communication point
of view. In particular, cooperative jamming signals protect information carrying signals via
alignment, and the information carrying signals are further aligned to maximize secure d.o.f.
A Proof of Theorem 2
We first provide an outline of the proof. Our proof will combine and extend techniques
from [5] and [26]. Our approach has three main components. First, as in [5], we condition
the mutual information representing the secrecy leakage rate on the signals that carry the
messages of other transmitter-receiver pairs. That is, for any given i, we condition the
subtracted mutual information term in (91) on V K−i . This creates enhanced eavesdroppers.
If we can guarantee secrecy against these enhanced eavesdroppers, we can guarantee secrecy
against the original eavesdroppers. More specifically, for the leakage rate of message of
transmitter i at receiver j, with j 6= i, we use
I(Vi; Yj|V
K
−i) = I(Vi; Yj, V
K
−i)
△
= I(Vi; Y˜j) (125)
where Y˜j
△
= (Yj, V
K
−i) is the output of an enhanced eavesdropper with respect to message
Wi. Second, as in [26], we consider the secrecy rate achievable against the strongest en-
hanced eavesdropper for each message. Therefore, as argued in [26, Appendex A], if we can
guarantee a secrecy rate against the strongest eavesdropper, we can guarantee this secrecy
rate against the original eavesdroppers. More specifically, let Y (i) be an element of the set
{Y1, . . . , Yk, Z}\{Yi} such that
I(Vi; Y
(i)|V K−i) = max
j∈K0,−i
(Vi; Yj|V
K
−i) (126)
That is, Y (i) is the strongest eavesdropper with respect to transmitter i. The achievable
rate in (91) considers the strongest eavesdropper for each message. Therefore, for each
transmitter i, we construct a compound wiretap code as in [26]. Third, we prove secrecy for
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each message Wi, via the following equivocation inequality
H(Wi|Y
(i),VK−i) ≥ H(Wi)− nǫ
(i), i = 1, . . . , K (127)
for some arbitrarily small number ǫ(i). Here, as in the main body of the paper, we denote
n-length sequences with boldface letters. The secrecy constraints in (127) fit the created
equivalent view of the channel better. As we show next, secrecy constraints in (127) imply
our original secrecy constraints in (4) and (5).
Towards this end, first note that, for each i,
H(Wi|Yj,V
K
−i) ≥ H(Wi|Y
(i),VK−i) ≥ H(Wi)− nǫ
(i) (128)
for all j ∈ K0,−i since Y (i) is the strongest eavesdropper with respect to transmitter i and by
using the enhanced eavesdropper argument in [26, Appendex A]. Then, the fact that (127)
for all i implies the original secrecy constraints in (4) and (5) follows from the following
derivation:
H(WK−j|Yj) ≥ H(W
K
−j|Yj,Wj) (129)
≥
∑
i 6=j
H(Wi|Yj,W
K
−i) (130)
≥
∑
i 6=j
H(Wi|Yj,V
K
−i,W
K
−i) (131)
=
∑
i 6=j
H(Wi|Yj,V
K
−i) (132)
≥
∑
i 6=j
H(Wi|Y
(i),VK−i) (133)
≥
∑
i 6=j
[
H(Wi)− nǫ
(i)
]
(134)
= H(WK−j)− nǫ
(−j) (135)
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where (132) is due to the Markov chain WK−i → (Yj,V
K
−i)→Wi. Similarly,
H(WK |Z) ≥
∑
i
H(Wi|Z,W
K
−i) (136)
≥
∑
i
H(Wi|Z,V
K
−i,W
K
−i) (137)
=
∑
i
H(Wi|Z,V
K
−i) (138)
≥
∑
i
H(Wi|Y
(i),VK−i) (139)
≥
∑
i
[
H(Wi)− nǫ
(i)
]
(140)
= H(WK)− nǫ(Z) (141)
where ǫ(Z) is small for sufficiently large n.
We start by choosing the following rates for the secure and confusion messages of trans-
mitter i:
Ri = I(Vi; Yi)− I(Vi; Y
(i)|V K−i)− ǫ (142)
Rci = I(Vi; Y
(i)|V K−i)− ǫ (143)
Transmitter i generates 2n(Ri+R
c
i ) independent sequences each with probability
p(vi) =
n∏
t=1
p(vit) (144)
and constructs a codebook as
Ci
△
=
{
vi(wi, w
c
i ) : wi ∈ {1, . . . , 2
nRi}, wci ∈ {1, . . . , 2
nRci}
}
(145)
To transmit a message wi, transmitter i chooses an element vi from the sub-codebook Ci(wi)
Ci(wi)
△
=
{
vi(wi, w
c
i ) : w
c
i ∈ {1, . . . , 2
nRci}
}
(146)
and generates a channel input sequence based on
p(xi|vi) (147)
Due to the code construction, we have Ri + R
c
i < I(Vi; Yi), for all i. Therefore, for
sufficiently large ni, we can find a codebook such that the probability of error at the corre-
sponding receiver i can be upper bounded by an arbitrarily small number, i.e., Pr(ei)
(ni) ≤ ǫ.
Then, let n = maxi ni, which gives maxi Pr(ei)
(n) ≤ ǫ.
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For the equivocation calculation, we consider the following conditional entropy as dis-
cussed before:
H(Wi|Y
(i),VK−i) =H(Wi,Y
(i)|VK−i)−H(Y
(i)|VK−i) (148)
=H(Wi,Vi,Y
(i)|VK−i)−H(Vi|Wi,Y
(i),VK−i)−H(Y
(i)|VK−i) (149)
=H(Wi,Vi|V
K
−i) +H(Y
(i)|Wi,Vi,V
K
−i)−H(Vi|Wi,Y
(i),VK−i)
−H(Y(i)|VK−i) (150)
=H(Wi,Vi|V
K
−i)−H(Vi|Wi,Y
(i),VK−i) +H(Y
(i)|Vi,V
K
−i)−H(Y
(i)|VK−i)
(151)
where the last equality is due to the Markov chain Wi → (Vi,VK−i)→ Y
(i).
The first term in (151) is exactly the entropy of codebook Ci
H(Vi) = n(Ri +R
c
i ) (152)
To bound the second term in (151), we have the following observation: Given the message
Wi = wi and the received sequencesY
(i) = y(i) and genie-aided sequencesVK−i = v
K
−i, receiver
Y (i) can decode the codeword vi(wi, w
c
i ) with arbitrarily small probability of error λ(wi)
(n)
as n gets very large. More formally: by giving Wi = wi,V
K
−i = v
K
−i, receiver Y
(i) decodes Vi
if there is a unique wci such that
(
vi(wi, w
c
i ),y
(i)
)
∈ T (n)ǫ (PV1,Y (i)|V K
−i
) (153)
Otherwise, the receiver declares an error. Without loss of generality, we assume that
vi(wi, w
c
1) is sent and denote the event
{
(vi(wi, w
c
j),y
(i)) ∈ T (n)ǫ (PV1,Y (i)|V K
−i
)
}
as Ej . There-
fore, the probability of error λ(wi)
(n) can be bounded as
λ(wi)
(n) ≤ Pr(Ec1) +
∑
j 6=1
Pr(Ej) (154)
where the probability here is conditioned on the event that vi(wi, w
c
1) is sent. By joint
typicality, we know that Pr(Ec1) ≤ ǫ1 for sufficiently large n, and
Pr(Ej) ≤ 2
nH(Vi,Y (i)|V K
−i)−nH(Vi)−nH(Y
(i)|VK
−i)−nǫ2 = 2−nI(VI ;Y
(i)|V K
−i)−nǫ2 (155)
Hence,
λ(wi)
(n) ≤ ǫ1 + 2
nRci 2−nI(VI ;Y
(i)|V K
−i)−nǫ2 (156)
Note that Rci = I(Vi; Y
(i)|V K−i) − ǫ. Therefore, we can conclude that λ(wi)
(n) ≤ ǫ3 for
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sufficiently large n, which by Fano’s inequality further implies that
H(Vi|Wi,Y
(i),VK−i) =
∑
Wi=wi,Y(i)=y(i),VK
−i=v
K
−i
H(Vi|wi,y
(i),vK−i) ≤ nǫ4 (157)
The third term in (151) can be lower bounded as follows:
H(Y(i)|Vi,V
K
−i) =
∑
vi,v
K
−i
Pr(Vi = vi)Pr(V
K
−i = v
K
−i)H(Y
(i)|Vi = vi,V
K
−i = v
K
−i) (158)
≥
∑
(vi,vK
−i)∈T
(n)
ǫ (PVi,V K
−i
)
[
Pr(Vi = vi)Pr(V
K
−i = v
K
−i)
H(Y(i)|Vi = vi,V
K
−i = v
K
−i)
]
(159)
≥
∑
(vi,vK
−i)∈T
(n)
ǫ (PVi,V K
−i
)
[
Pr(Vi = vi)Pr(V
K
−i = v
K
−i)
∑
(a,b)∈Vi×VK
−i
N(a, b|vi,v
K
−i)
∑
y(i)∈Y(i)
−p(y(i)|a, b) log p(y(i)|a, b)
]
(160)
≥
∑
(vi,vK
−i)∈T
(n)
ǫ (PVi,V K
−i
)
[
Pr(Vi = vi)Pr(V
K
−i = v
K
−i)
∑
(a,b)∈Vi×VK
−i
n
(
Pr(Vi = a, V
K
−i = b)− ǫ5
)
∑
y(i)∈Y(i)
−p(y(i)|a, b) log p(y(i)|a, b)
]
(161)
≥
∑
(vi,vK
−i)∈T
(n)
ǫ (PVi,V K
−i
)
n
[
Pr(Vi = vi)Pr(V
K
−i = v
K
−i)H(Y
(i)|Vi, V
K
−i)− ǫ6
]
(162)
≥ (1− ǫ7)nH(Y
(i)|Vi, V
K
−i)− nǫ8 (163)
≥ nH(Y (i)|Vi, V
K
−i)− nǫ9 (164)
To compute the forth term in (151), we define
Yˆ(i) =
{
Y(i), if (vK−i,y
(i)) ∈ T (n)ǫ (PV K
−i,Y
(i))
arbitrary, otherwise
(165)
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Then, we obtain
H(Y(i)|VK−i) =
∑
vK
−i
Pr(VK−i = v
K
−i)H(Y
(i)|VK−i = v
K
−i) (166)
≤
∑
vK
−i
Pr(VK−i = v
K
−i)H(Y
(i), Yˆ(i)|VK−i = v
K
−i) (167)
=
∑
vK
−i
Pr(VK−i = v
K
−i)
[
H(Yˆ(i)|VK−i = v
K
−i) +H(Y
(i)|VK−i = v
K
−i, Yˆ
(i))
]
(168)
≤ nH(Y (i)|V K−i) + nǫ10 +
∑
vK
−i
[
Pr(VK−i = v
K
−i)H(Y
(i)|VK−i = v
K
−i, Yˆ
(i))
]
(169)
Combining Fano’s inequality and the fact that
Pr(Y(i) 6= Yˆ(i)) ≤ Pr
{
(VK−i,Y
(i)) 6∈ T (n)ǫ (PV K
−i,Y
(i))
}
(170)
is arbitrarily small for sufficiently large n, (169) implies
H(Y(i)|VK−i) ≤ nH(Y
(i)|V K−i) + nǫ10 + nǫ11 (171)
Substituting (152), (157), (164), and (171) into (151), we conclude that
H(Wi|Y
(i),VK−i) ≥ H(Wi)− nǫ
(i) (172)
where ǫ(i) is small for sufficiently large n, which completes the proof.
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